Main Presentation
Resumption of India-Pakistan official dialogue and the Prospects
of peace
By Tapan K. Bose
After living in a hostile atmosphere for more than five decades,
it is natural that Indians and Pakistanis should want to live
in peace. Yet peace eludes the people of the subcontinent. The
failure of the recent summit level dialogue between Pakistan’s
President General Parvez Musharrraf and Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee, which was held in July 2001 after two years
shows that despite all indications of ‘softening of attitude
’ the governments are still trapped in their hard nationalist
positions on Jammu and Kashmir. This five plus decades old dispute
over the territory of the former princely state in the foothills
of the Himalayas lies at the very centre of this rivalry. This
has caused three wars, hundreds of border clashes, deaths of thousands
and displacement of millions. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir
brought nuclear weapons to the subcontinent pushing the peoples
of India and Pakistan to live under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust.
History of failed talks:
There have been several attempts in the past by the governments
of India and Pakistan to make peace. As the history shows the
majority of these peace talks or agreements between India and
Pakistan were mere lip services to peace rather than an actual
commitment to reach a truce. Neither party was willing to make
any concessions. This has created a history of ideological disagreements
between governments of India and Pakistan and fostered a so-called
‘national consensus’ with deep situated distrust among
influential sections of ‘nationalist’ or ‘patriotic’
Indians and Pakistanis towards each other. In the national politics
of India and Pakistan, from the beginning the Kashmir issue was
appropriated by the ‘supra-nationalists’ and it determined
the perspective of on peace and security. How the Kashmir dispute
or issue has come to dominate the discourse on nationalism and
bilateral relations between India and Pakistan may be summarised
in the following manner:
· In Pakistan, the religious right and the military appropriated
the Kashmir issue claiming that 'protecting the honour of Muslim
brothers and sisters and recovering their homeland from non-Muslim
oppressors' was the 'sacred' duty of every Muslim and therefore,
that of the Pakistan State.
· In India, both the religious right and the secular nationalists
projected the struggle of the Kashmiri people as an assault on
the integrity of the nation as well as its secularism. Together
they whipped up a militarised nationalism in the name of 'fighting
Pakistan’s proxy war' thus setting the context in which defending
the territorial integrity of the 'Motherland' became both the
'divine duty' as well as the 'secular commitment' of every Indian.
· In Kashmir itself it altogether militarised the struggle
legitimising violence and squeezing out the space for popular
struggle. The victim on all fronts has been the legitimate aspirations
of the people and the democratic struggle against oppression and
the fascist response of the state. In both country people struggling
for substantive democracy and genuine reforms shied away from
engaging with the Kashmir struggle, anxious to avoid entrapment
in the manipulative politics of militarised nationalism and religious
fundamentalism.
The Agra Summit:
However, over the last six months certain ‘initiatives’
taken by the Prime Minister of India in Jammu and Kashmir had
raised expectations for the resumption of official level ‘peace
talks’ which was stalled after the 1999 Kargil War. Though
the Indian Prime Minister’s invitation to General Musharraf
to a summit meeting had come all of a sudden, many Indian analysts
saw it as a culmination of some of Prime Miniter Vajpayee’s
peace building initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir. It was said that
after the breakdown of the unilateral cease-fire announced by
the Hizbul Mujahideen in July 2000, hopes for peace was revived
by Prime Minister Vajpayee through the declaration of a 'unilateral'
ceasefire during Ramazan in Kashmir. Pakistan government's timely
response in the form of partial withdrawal of trops from the Line
of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and the extension of the ceasefire
by India to February 26, 2001 and beyond were seen as signals
of hope.
The appointment of Mr. K. C. Pant, the Planning Minister as
a one-man negotiating team with a mandate to hold talks with all
Kashmiri political groups including those which have been advocating
seperation from India was perceived as the Vajpayee government’s
willingness to resolve the political crisis in Jammu and Kashmir
in a democratic framework. Most Indian media analysts had summarized
the developments during the period between July/August 2000 and
March/April 2001 in the following manner: ·
The first indication of the softening of Indian attitude was
seen when India indicated that it was willing to hold peace talks
with the Hizbul Mujahideen in the framework of insaniyat (humanity)
rather than within strict constitutional limits. (Though there
was confusion as to what constitued the framework of humanity.)
· The declaration of the unilateral ceasefire during Ramazan
(November 2000) and its extension despite its rejection by Jihadi
organisations was another indication of Indian governments willingness
to make peace. ·
Pakistan's decision of partial troop withdrawals from the Line
of Control in Jammu and Kashmir in December 2000 in response to
India’s ‘unilateral cease-fire’ in November 2000
which resulted in significant reduction in border clashes was
read as an indication of Pakistan’s willingness to soften
its position. Pakistan’s invitation to All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC) was interpreted as Pakistan’s attempt to
somewhat distance itself from the militant/Jihadist line of struggle
in Kashmir. · The fact that both countries, especially India,
were showing willingness to pick up official level peace talks
that were ruined due to the Kargil war where Pakistan supported
the invasion by Islamic militants into Indian-held Kashmir in
April/May 1999. During this period there was a visible increase
in the activities on the 'non-official', 'track-2' and 'peoples'
track' efforts by members of the elite in both India and Pakistan
in the past few months. The cease-fire offer lent vigour to the
initiatives by the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and
Democracy and the South Asian Forum for Human Rights to include
Kashmiri civil society elements (both sides) into the peace discourse.
There were reports that a few U.S.-based Kashmiri groups were
exerting political pressure on the US administration to bring
the Indian and Pakistani governments to the negotiation table.
It was also reported in a section of the American press that a
group of senior officers of Pakistan’s military had approached
a NGO in the U.S. for brokering talks with India.
Why Agra Summit Failed:
Whatever might have been the reasons that brought about the
summit in Agra on July 14 and 15, 2001 it is obvious that the
summit had raised high hopes on both sides of the border. If the
developments of the preceding seven months were indications of
any real change in the attitude and approach of the two governments,
then the Agra summit should have produced some positive results.
Yet it appeared that the two governments had gone to the meeting
without much preparations. Much hope was pinned on the one to
one talks between General Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee.
It was assumed that a military ruler and a radical nationalist
prime minister were best equipped to make a radical break from
traditional positions. Yet they failed. As it became apparent
that the two were not willing to budge even a millimeter from
their respective positions on Kashmr.
It seems that during the talks in Agra, India refused to accept
that Kashmir was the ‘core’ or the ‘central issue’.
While Pakistan insisted that Jammu and Kashmir was a ‘disputed
territory’, India claimed Jammu and Kashmir’s ‘accession’
to India was final and irreversible and that the only dispute
was over the portions of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir which
was ‘under illegal occupation of Pakistan’. It accused
Pakistan of sponsoring ‘cross border terrorism’ in Indian
administered territories of Jammu and Kashmir. While Pakistan
claimed that it was supporting the ‘freedom struggle’
of the people of Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir and accused
India for gross violations of the human rights of the people of
Jammu and Kashmir, India asserted that the ‘so-called’
movement in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir was an ‘internal
matter’ and Pakistan had no business interfering in India’s
internal matters. It seems that India was willing to discuss the
Kashmir ‘issue’ with Pakistan only in the context of
‘cross border terrorism ’.
Future of the Peace Process:
The need to guard against minimalist solution dictated by ‘realpolitik’
In my opinion, the failure of the Agra summit is not a set back
to the genuine peace process. If peace is not just a cessation
of war or postponement of a conflict, then the solution of the
Kashmir dispute should be based on the principles of reconciliation
that would heal the wounds and address the issues of justice for
the victims in a non-retributive framework. In Agra the two leaders
were engaged in an exercise to resolve the Kashmir dispute within
the bounds of the 'reasons of the realm', and the logic of 'realism'.
It seemed that Indian and Pakistani governments had begun to
take a more pragmatic stance to the dispute over Kashmir. It was
seen by many peace activist in Kashmir, India and Pakistan essentially
as a move towards acceptance of the logic of ‘realpolitik’.
There was a legitimate fear that under pressure of the global
powers and squeezed by their own failing economies, the two governments
might go for a 'minimalist' solution, that is converting the Line
of Control (LoC) in Kashmir into the international border between
India and Pakistan after making minor adjustments on ground to
protect each other's strategic installations in the region.
Any partition of Kashmir today will lead to disastrous consequences.
It will unleash massive violence along ethnic, religious and linguistic
fault lines in the entire Jammu and Kashmir because in the new
divided entities each group would start manoeuvring for greater
control of the political power and privileges. There is every
reason to fear that this violence would spill over into the whole
of India and Pakistan. · Indian state, on the one side, is
aspiring to become a new (regional) super-power, not just in economic,
but also in geo-strategic terms. This is evident from its efforts
to garner support for its application for a permanent seat in
the UN Security Council. Its attempts to build alliance with the
U.S., Russia and China to isolate Afghanistan and the "strategic
partnership against a common threat" with Russia on anti-terrorism.
In order to achieve these goals, India would like to foster good
relations with the West (e.g., the U.S). This, however, cannot
be done while fighting an internal war in Kashmir, or worse a
cross-border war with Pakistan. In this context the September
2000 statement of the head of Indian army that the Kashmir problem
could not be solved militarily and his endorsement to the extension
of the unilateral ceasefire, despite the continuation of hostile
activities by militant/Jihadi groups in Indian administered Kashmir
may be seen as a move towards realpolitik.
· Pakistan, on the other side, even though potentially
having similar aspiration, is struggling with a failing economy
and increasing international isolation because of its politics
in Kashmir (but also Afghanistan). Therefore, Pakistan cannot
afford to turn down offers of ceasefire and dialogue from India,
nor can it afford in the long run to continue fighting a war in
Kashmir since a continued engagement with Islamic militants supported
by domestic extremist parties holds the far greater danger of
fuelling social disintegration in Pakistan by increasing the gap
between the liberal-secular and the religious-extremist forces.
· In this context it is important to note that almost all
the non-governmental actors in Jammu and Kashmir, both in India
as well as in Pakistan administered areas, are apprehensive that
the two governments- India and Pakistan might be moving towards
a partition based solution of the Kashmir dispute. In other words,
Kashmir would be permanently divided along the Line of Control.
All most all Kashmiris are frightened by this prospect as they
fear that this would lead to forced movement of populations and
massive bloodshed due to ethnic, religious and sectarian violence.
It is this fear, which has opened a new debate in Kashmir about
the ethno-religious perspective and bias of the movement that
began in 1990. This is also motivating Kashmiris to reach out
to broader democratic parties and civil society groups in India
and Pakistan for support. Some of them are actively seeking the
assistance of civil society organisation from the region as well
from outside the region in their quest for a non-military solution.
(It is not a unique to Kashmir. Under similar conditions in the
Baltic republics the decision of the local authorities, de facto
and de jure, to invite outside assistance had opened opportunities
for the domestic civil society actors to seek assistance of outside
actors for a peaceful and non-violent means to resolve existing
conflicts.) This has opened up a real window of opportunity for
democratizing the peace process in Kashmir.
The challenge posed by 'ideologies' of state:
The western governments see Kashmir as a potential nuclear flash-point.
In the post-cold war geo-politics Islamic fundamentalism as emerged
as the west ’s enemy number one. The growing nexus between
the Talibans in Afghanistan and the Islamic Jihadi forces in Pakistan
on one hand and the failure of the Pakistani regime to control
these forces has increased western concern about the spread of
‘terrorism’. Terrorism as we know has emerged as one
of the main concern’s of the global powers today. And in
this global fight against terrorism India had become a vocal partner.
This new alliance between India and the west became visible during
the Kargil war, when the western powers led by the USA assisted
India in reclaiming the grounds it had lost. As we all know, Kargil
was not a military, but essentially a diplomatic one.
Some of the India business groups led by the powerful houses
of the Ambanis have also been involved in lobbying Indian and
Pakistani government leaders. It is said that it was this business
group which was responsible for setting up the ‘second’
or the ‘back door’ channel of contact between the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan and the government of United States
at the height of the Kargil war in July 1999. Apart from the need
to ensure the safety of its large industrial establishments on
India’s West Coast, the Ambani group is reported to be involved
in the proposed Iran-India gas and oil pipelines.
Mindful of India’s opposition to international interference
in what it considers a strictly bilateral issue, and not wanting
to annoy its newly acquired partner in South Asia, the western
powers have been trying to exercise their influence through the
so-called ‘track-two’ diplomacy. Of these the Nimrana
Dialogue Group, the Kashmir Study Group and the recently held
Wilton Park conference are well known. particularly as the two
warring governments have acquired nuclear weapons. The international
finance lobby, multinational business groups and their collaborators
and counterparts in the subcontinent are keen on restoration of
peace as this would improve the climate for investment and open
up hitherto untapped resources and markets.
Generations of Indians and Pakistanis have been brought up on
a creed of hatred of the other. In fact this hate has became an
essential component of the definition of the national 'self'.
This autogenous hatred provides the moral sanction for all types
of actions aimed at wresting Kashmir from the clutches of the
other. No matter how we look at it, the dispute over the territory
of Kashmir constitutes the core of the national ideologies of
India and Pakistan today. It is the arena of the last war between
India and Pakistan, the two self-righteous entities who are driven
by an autogenous hatred for the other. Any attempt to reduce the
importance of the Kashmir dispute by trying to treat it at per
with other disputes between India and Pakistan will not help the
dialogue process in any manner. It will only reaffirm Pakistan's
fear that India wants to sidetrack the real or the core issue
and trap Pakistan into a diplomatic game where it would be forced
to give up its.
A sustainable peace:
It needs to be emphasised that if the search for peace remains limited to dialogue between the representatives of the governments of India and Pakistan, it would fail to achieve a sustainable peace. It is important for India and Pakistan to recognize that they have a dispute over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It is equally important for them to understand that Kashmir never was and is not a mere territorial dispute between them. The people of Kashmir whether they live in Indian held Kashmir or in Pakistan held Kashmir they are the real parties to this dispute. It is their future that is at stake and the injustice done to them by both India and Pakistan for the ‘reasons of state’ has to be redressed. All Kashmiris, irrespective of whether they belong to India or Pakistan held areas eventually have to be brought to the peace table.
The Vajpayee government in India can turn its initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir into a real opportunity for peace building by immediately initiating steps to restore the rule of law in the valley and ordering its forces to respect human rights of the people of Kashmir. Both the governments of India and Pakistan are guilty of denying the basic democratic rights to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir under their control. They havee manipulated every so-called’elections’ and continued to impose’client’ governments in the territories of "Azad Kashmir’ or Jammu and Kashmir’. They should simultaneously lift all restrictions against peaceful public activities in all parts of Jammu and Kashmir. This will enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to discuss their social and political problems and their future in a democratic manner. As the Kashmiri civil society recaptures its lost space and the vexing question, ‘whom do we talk to in Kashmir’ will lose its relevance. A vibrant civil society will provide the answers. It is necessary for the two governments to recognize the following:
1. The people of J & K have the right to take steps towards the regeneration of a secular, pluralistic and non-violent civil society and the reconstruction of the polity along democratic lines.
2. The people of South Asia, particularly, India and Pakistan have an obligation to help the people of J & K in this process.
3. The states of India and Pakistan must stop the policy of suppressing the people and communalizing the situation, demilitarize the region and establish a durable peace.
4. For the fulfillment of the aspirations of the people of J & K, a policy of reconciliation and peace is the first necessary step forward.
Immediate efforts have to begin to institute dialogue among
various sections of civil society in J & K, among the people
of the different regions and sub-regions of J & K, and also
among the people of India and Pakistan for the realization of
the democratic aspirations of the people in the region.
