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Beena Sarwar
"Human rights in Pakistan: Challenges of
orthodoxy and Autocracy"

 

It is often argued that the ideal of human rights first enunciated in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is a Western concept, a luxury -- like democracy -- that only wealthy countries can afford. Examples are given of how the West has finally arrived at a comfortable balance between economic security and individual rights, having long ago overcome situations like those prevailing today in many developing countries. Isn't it far better, it is argued, to emulate the Asian Tigers, which have gone about the task of nation-building by concentrating on economic development and providing decent standards of living; so they haven't granted individual and political freedoms but at least people have food to eat.

The latter option is flawed in that it envisages autocratic governance. This has been rejected by human experience on the grounds that it lacks the mechanism to guarantee a benevolent, wise, and incorruptible rule and smooth transition of power. It is not even a guarantee of stable development. The recent collapse of their economies has shown that even the so-called Asian Tigers have claws of clay.

What is needed is a multi-pronged, holistic way of development, which aims at economic prosperity and a just social order that guarantees fundamental freedoms. Is this possible in Pakistan given the conflicts that the country is undergoing? Several major factors bar the way:

1. Intolerance and religious extremism;
2. Lack of socio-economic development;
3. Relations with India;
4. Authoritarian governments.

Since these factors are inter-linked, there will be some overlapping while discussing them.

1. Intolerance and religious extremism

The biggest threat to human rights in Pakistan today is growing intolerance within society, largely due to the religious militancy and extremism which have visibly increased since the Afghan War. Intolerance has been reinforced by discriminatory laws enacted in the name of religion, and political expediency by successive governments.

This has led not just to greater discrimination against non-Muslims, it has caused sectarian confrontation within the Muslim population, conflict between the orthodoxy and liberals over observance of social mores, and a running polarisation between political right and left. Today, we are faced with two stark choices: modernisation and development, or regression into tribalism.

The conflict between these trends is intensified by increasing exposure to the outside world on the one hand (for example through expatriate labour), access to the satellite dish and the internet, and education, particularly of girls and women even in remote villages and rural areas. On the other hand is the 'talibanisation' of society, fed by thousands of religious seminaries across the country, functioning with government sanction and even money, besides covert funds from other Islamic countries.

It is the latter that most threatens individual freedoms in the country. The optimistic see it as the last gasp of a dying order. The more visible the modernisation, and the more girls and women get educated and go out to work, the fiercer is the reaction from the orthodox who feel that these developments threaten their very existence -- as indeed they do. The threat comes through changing ideas, not force; the result is loss of power, and the retaliation is often violent because bigotry cannot stand up to debate and reason.

The country's domestic, economic and foreign policies have been as much of a factor in the development of both strains -- and the resulting conflict -- as the role of the outside world. The final outcome, whichever trend eventually prevails, will also be determined by both.

The impact of outside players: Over the last twenty years particularly, Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies have directly and indirectly contributed to the rise of the religious extremism, which has also been given a boost by policies of countries like the USA. During the Afghan war, religious forces were supported because it suited the United State's agenda of fighting communism. It is ironic that Osama bin Laden is the most wanted man for the CIA, on whose payroll he once operated. The USA also propped up Gen. Ziaul Haq's military dictatorship with financial, military, and moral support, ignoring the human rights abuses perpetuated by his regime; Pakistan tailored its foreign policy accordingly.

This is not a closed chapter. The taliban are today castigated and condemned world-wide - but tomorrow, if it suits the Western interests to have the taliban over-running Pakistan, what is the guarantee that these so-called champions of democracy will not again proceed accordingly?

Impact of national policies: Although Ziaul Haq has been dead and gone these past twelve years, Pakistan has not done anything to reverse or counter the phenomenon that was given momentum by the Afghan War. On the contrary, by constantly capitulating to their demands, the leadership of Pakistan has encouraged religious parties into thinking that it is their approval which bestows upon a government the stamp of legitimacy, of being 'Islamic', rather than the democratic process of general elections. No general election has ever given the religious parties more than a combined three or four per cent of the seats in the assemblies; the electorate has simply never voted for them. Realising that they can never attain power through the democratic process, they have thus decided to eschew this process and bludgeon their way into policy and decision-making, never mind democracy.

Intolerance and religious and gender discrimination, already prevelant over much of South Asia, have in Pakistan been reinforced by laws which promote and sanctify these trends. Many of these laws were introduced as part of his Islamisation policy by Gen. Ziaul Haq who used religion to justify his stint in power - as all governments in Pakistan have done. They include the Hudood Ordinance, the so-called Blasphemy law, and the separate electorate system, and the setting up of the Shariat (Islamic laws) Courts which are above constitution.

The Hudood Ordinance, instituted in 1979 by Gen. Zia, institutionalises discrimination against women. It made sex outside marriage a cognizable offence (a crime against the state) and rape a personal crime., it places the focus of public morality on women, and has encouraged the institution of false adultery cases against women for ulterior motives like property or wanting a second marriage.

Rape victims risk being charged with adultery if they cannot prove the rape charges. The Qisas and Diyat law further undermines the status of women by equating two women with one man as witnesses in court, and also providing a lesser compensation for women than men in criminal cases.

Pakistan is perhaps the only country where the phenomenon of 'honour killings' is increasing instead of decreasing. The custom of killing a woman for sex outside marriage is rooted in custom rather than religion, pre-dating Islam. It originated in ancient times probably in the Middle East, but has also been prevalent Northern Africa and in Latin and Greek cultures (remember Zorba the Greek, starring Anthony Quinn), and over parts of the Indian Sub-Continent. In effect, Islam discouraged such false accusation as well as such killings by prescribing a strict condition of witnesses -- at least four adult men of good character had to see the actual act of penetration before guilt could be established and the punishment of death meted out.

This condition has been interpreted in Pakistan to the detriment of rape victims who risk being found guilty of sex outside marriage if they cannot produce such witnesses, since their complaint of rape is then seen as 'confession' of 'intercourse'. Although Islam prescribes strict punishments for false accusations, no one has ever been punished for this crime, even though the higher courts have almost invariably found the women accused of zina to be not guilty. Still, the mere accusation of adultery remains enough to kill women, or throw them into prison until sentence is pronounced. Since the Hudood Ordinances came into being, thousands of women have been incarcerated on accusations of zina, whereas before, compared to the one or two such accusations before.

It is significant that in most countries where the custom of honour killings prevailed, laws have been made and implemented to discourage such murders. In Pakistan, on the other hand, not only do laws like the Hudood Ordinances and even judgements by superior courts reinforce the concept of women aslesser beings, no law has been made to outlaw such practice. Far from it, the Senate (Upper House of Parliament) rejected by a thumping majority a resolution condemning honour killings, and the government is even considering enacting a law to justify them.

Other customs still prevalent include sale of women in marriage, marriage to Quran, being used as 'gifts' as settlement of tribal dispute and the distribution of the widow along with the rest of the property of a deceased.

The Blasphemy law (Section 295-C) similarly makes it easy to discriminate against religious minorities by providing severe punishment for offences like 'injuring religious sentiments of Muslims', and capital punishment for those found guilty of insulting the Prophet Mohammed. Since what injures one Muslim's sentiments may have no effect on another, it leaves the issue open to interpretation, providing the unscrupulous a means to settle personal scores. False charges of blasphemy have been levelled, and then lower courts intimidated by virtual siege to pronounce convinction. Again, no one has ever been punished for making false accusations.

The separate electorate system denies religious minorities their share in governance and political representation, effectively cutting them off from the mainstream by making them vote only for their co-religionists on reserved seats. Their votes are thus irrelevant to the major political parties. Meanwhile, in the area where there should be reserved seats, for women, the provision has been allowed to lapse, while in many areas, women are not allowed to exercise their right to vote.

But even before Ziaul Haq, a law passed by parliament under Z.A. Bhutto, laid the foundation for systematic persecution of the Ahmedis, who were officially declared to be non-Muslim. They were not only prohibited from calling themselves Muslim, but also doing, saying or writing anything that would even suggest that they belonged to that faith. The persecution has been a systematic one. For example, the information demanded in application forms for Pakistani passports includes the applicant's religion. Those who write that they are Muslim have to also sign an affidavit denouncing as be an imposter and a non-Muslim Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, the spiritual leader of the Ahmedis.

More recently, religious extremism was given a great boost in August last year, when the government proposed a new law to overarch all Islamic laws, Constitutional Amendment 15 which not only aimed to make Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of the land, but also to give government total power to ordain what it thought right according to Islam and prohibit what is wrong. This law, if passed by the Senate this coming March, will enable the government to supersede all other laws and empower it to decide between what it considered right and wrong.

2. Unequal development and administrative failures

The focus on religion (as a panacea) and women/morality (as a problem) diverts from the real issues, rooted in economic deprivation and unequal development. During the Afghan Jehad and since, no attempts were made to improve the infrastructure or to bring about progressive societal changes in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The main beneficiaries in areas of deprivation are drug barons and warlords, who always benefit from conflict situations and exploit administrative failures for their own gains.

For example when the exploitative Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulations in the north of Pakistan were struck down as unconstitutional in 1994 by the Supreme Court, it left an administrative vacuum. Using the availability of arms and ammunition in the area, along with the presence of many tribesmen who had fought in the Afghan War, the power-mongers there were able to recruit a large armed force under the banner of Sharia or Islamic law.

The concern over the rise of 'talibanisation' rarely goes beyond the surface to what has contributed to this phenomenon: deprivation and the denial of basics like health, education and employment opportunities. This is one of the factors behind the increasing number of boys being sent into madrassahs (religious seminaries), where they are at least guaranteed food, shelter, some kind of education and even employment as
fighters.

The fact that most of these madrassahs are sectarian in nature, perpetuating the belief that all those of rival sects are non-Muslim, has contributed to the increasing sectarian violence in the country. The only thing that all these sects agree upon is that the others are infidels, along with Ahmedis and pro-democracy, pro-human rights workers; many consider it legitimate to wipe out these 'ideological enemies of the state'. The government encourages them by studiously turning a deaf ear to their calls for such murders, and on occasion actively and publicly encouraging them to 'take care' of these enemies, as Nawaz Sharif did, for example, when CA 15 was being tabled.

Lack of social services The other day, a small boy, no more than six years old, barefoot and in tatters under the burning sun, tried to clean my car for a rupee or two. I asked him where his parents were, but he couldn't speak enough to articulate anything. For him, and for his family, the concept of human rights doesn't exist. They don't have adequate food, shelter or clothes. Clean drinking water, healthcare and education are light years away...

There are millions like him in Pakistan, living in abject poverty without a future. And yet this country spends most of its budget on maintaining a huge army, on defence and nuclear weapons, rather than developing the social sector to ensure that little children don't beg on the streets.

The conflict between modernisation and tradition is common to many developing countries, particularly those with colonial pasts. Problems are exacerbated by the clash between thoughtless, unplanned development and traditional practices and beliefs, with adherents to the latter becoming even more rigid in clinging to what they know best rather than risk entering a new world of frightening changes. These tensions are heightened by increasing economic hardships and flux.

The government's responsibility: In Pakistan the conflict has been accentuated by a combination of authoritarianism and the use of religion for political purposes. Unlike the Asian Tigers which have maintained secular polities and at least provided basic social services despite their authoritarianism, the military dictatorships and dictatorial civilian governments in Pakistan have not improved these either. Most of the population continues to live in medieval times - with medieval mindsets which can kill for wealth, women, land (zar, zan, zameen). Add to this the concept of honour and the tendency to kill for sreligion, and you have a combustible situation. These concerns, besides that of obtaining two square meals a day, tend to overshadow fundamental rights like freedom of expression.

Lack of awareness about fundamental freedoms and the people's preoccupation with survival does not absolve the government from its responsibility of providing these freedoms. But the government and its various arms use lack of awareness and people's acceptance of their lot, as an opportunity to not provide these freedoms, and indeed to violate them.

Domestic or international pressure about human rights violations brings about a typically knee-jerk reaction from the government. A detained editor is released (weeks after being kidnapped), cases against a newspaper organisation are suspended -- for the moment, officers in charge are suspended with great fanfare, money is doled out to families of raped women and children, threats are made about ensuring that the culprits are hung in public (as they were in Zia's time), but little is done to redress the pattern of violence and create a more just order.

Instead, the government uses social deprivations to make populist noises, as Bhutto did with his popular slogan of 'roti kapra aur makan' (bread, clothes and housing). Another popular slogan is 'speedy justice' - a concept which further subverts the judiciary and the legal process.

Fundamental freedoms like right to dissent and political participation, freedom of speech and expression, freedom from arbitrary arrests, police excesses and torture, remain elusive dreams. Freedom of movement is assailed by liberal use of the law that empowers government to bar travel abroad (Exit from Pakistan Control Ordinance, introduced by Zia); freedom of association is under pressure with strong official criticism of NGOs and plans to bring in a new law to restrict their freedom; and a draconian anti-terrorism law and anti-terrorism courts make a mockery of the rule of law.

Promises made are never fulfilled - if they were, we wouldn't today have the horrific 'economic suicides', with people burning themselves to death because they or their families don't have enough food to eat. But the slogans continue.

It is ironic that the present government was elected into power on the basis of its manifesto promises like building the economy and improving relations with India. But although some efforts were made towards these ends, there is today a complete subversion of both.

The section of society most bitterly opposed to improving relations with India are the religious groups, for whom, since the end of the Afghan Jehad, Kashmir has increasingly become an ideological battleground.

3. The India factor

Pakistan's relations with India cannot be de-linked from the domestic situation, because hostilities contribute to and feed dangerous trends in both countries. The continuing human rights violations in Kashmir feed religious militancy in Pakistan, as does India's intransigence in refusing to discuss the issue. When the campaign against the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya gave the religious parties in India a rallying point, it also gave a momentum to the religious parties in Pakistan.

India's testing of nuclear devices at Pokhran in 1974 and then again in May 1998 cannot be condemned strongly enough, among other things, for contributing to tensions in the region and triggering off a dangerous arms race. When supporters of the nuclear tests were shown celebrating and distributing sweets in India, the tension mounted in Pakistan, only to find relief in matching celebrations when the mountain trembled in Chaghi. India's recently announced nuclear doctrine with its unabashedly aggressive stance has only further upped the ante.

Tensions with India, and its nuclear programme impacts Pakistan as a smaller neighbouring country which feels constantly threatened by what it perceives as Indian aggression, and which uses these factors to justify its own massive defence expenditure and unsustainable nuclear policy which divert resources from the social sector.

Relations with India are also used as a pretext to subvert fundamental rights in Pakistan, like the freedom of information and expression. Other common justifications for such violations are tradition, religion, and honour. The bogey of national security is used to justify human rights violations like the detention of Friday Times Editor Najam Sethi, ostensibly for a speech made in 'enemy territory', but actually for his publication's independent and critical stand against the government of the day. Subsequent to his release after no charges could be proven against him, a case has been made against him to de-bar him from voting as a Muslim, forcing him to defend his religious credentials.

Any independent-minded journalist or publication is open to this charge, just as all the NGOs and individuals working for human rights and political awareness are tarnished with the brush of 'un-patriotism' and even 'treason', and persecuted accordingly.

Another example is the situation that developed over the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, at Kargil. In the name of national security, the people of both countries were denied their right to know what was happening, and why -- not to mention the number of lives lost in this useless conflict. A flood of propaganda and misinformation on both sides contributed to a potentially catastrophic situation, given both countries' possession and flaunting of their nuclear weapons.

This underlines two important points relevant to the human rights debate: the lack of consultative decision making, and the nurturing of stereotypes that encourage the existing 'us' and 'them' perceptions, used by communities and individuals to justify violence and threats against the 'other'. The Kargil crisis has thrown up questions like who authorised the operation in the first place, and why? Why was the at least the cabinet committee on defence not consulted? Why are decision-making mechanisms of the country so weak? These questions are not being addressed or debated either in public fora or in the house of people's representatives.

4. Subverting democracy

The tendency of elected civilian governments in Pakistan to take on the traits of dictatorship includes intolerance of dissent and criticism -- subverting the promise of freedom and liberty made at Independence over 50 years ago. Authoritarianism and the tendency to make arbitrary decisions without consulting parliament or cabinet, let alone the opposition or the federating units, is a constant reminder that prime minister Nawaz Sharif is a protege of the late Gen. Zia. A continuation of Zia's repressive policies is visible not in just the government's continuing support of the religious parties in one way or another. If Zia gagged the press and had journalists arrested, even flogged, his successors through various strong arm tactics have ensured that the press exercises a large dose of self-censorship. The continuing intolerance of those in power to criticism and dissent encourages intolerance in all aspects of society, reducing the space for dissent and pluralism.

The slogan of 'speedy justice' finds a perverted interpretation in the increasingly obvious fake police 'encounters' in which 'terrorists' are regularly eliminated, a phenomenon particularly visible in Karachi at present. Police privately justify their actions by saying that this is the only way to rid society of known criminals who will only get bailed out if brought to trial - but it is also a very convenient way to rid of political opponents.

Three elected governments were dismissed by presidents using the powers vested in them through a constitutional amendment introduced by Zia. Not keen on being booted out a second time, Sharif in his second tenure has abolished these powers. He has reduced other potential threats to his tenure by sending packing a chief justice, a chief of army staff and a president before completion of their tenures. Further attempts to gather power are obvious in his introduction of the controversial 15th Amendment to the Constitution, which under the garb of Islamic law, would centre power more firmly in the prime minister's hands.

The despotic trend is also visible in how Islamabad deals with the federating units. When Nawaz Sharif announced that his government would build the controversial Kalabagh Dam, opposed by Sindh and NWFP, even cabinet members were taken by surprise. His government's recent decision to sell off the Karachi Electrical Supply Corporation in order to pay for the Daewoo-built Motorway that serves only the Punjab, is another example of the high-handedness which is causing resentment and undermining democratic principles.

The opposition's protests have now been made more difficult by the Anti-Terrorist Activities Act, which was recently amended by presidential ordinance, declaring the right to strike or public protest to be an act of terrorism. So on the one hand, there is a denial of rights, and on the other, protests against discrimination are labelled as criminal and terrorist activities carrying severe punishment. The recent amendment has been challenged in the Lahore High Court as being against fundamental rights - but why should it have to come to that.

Lack of participatory decision-making, the lack of freedom of information and expression, combined with the state's own tendency to violent methods to crush dissent, has contributed to a culture of fear and aggression, in which human rights cannot flourish, and which will only strengthen the forces of the militant right.

Resentment in the provinces is dangerous. The perception that the Punjab-dominated government is not giving the provinces their due rights, is substantiated by such issues and exacerbates communal and ethnic conflicts. The fears of ethnicity, identity, religion or language being threatened can have grave consequences, as we saw in 1971, when a civil war between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan led to the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh, with the active involvement of Indira Gandhi's India.

Today, India accuses Pakistan of interfering in Kashmir. But like East Pakistan, the uprising in Kashmir owes more to the state's misrule and human rights violations, than to the enemy, who may exploit the situation but who certainly hasn't created it. Armed unrest exacerbates regional tensions and provides more room for human rights violations. Hostilities increase as militant statements in the press and electronic media blame other governments for the conflict, ignoring the fact that there is a basis for discontent, and that unrest originally stemmed from political neglect.

To conclude, it is a combination of all these factors that endanger human rights in Pakistan. It is important for the media, particularly in the West, to understand the complexities of the situation rather than tarnishing an entire region or people with the same brush. Stereotyping only contributes to more militancy and makes it more difficult for human rights activists to operate. By condemning Pakistan as a 'rogue state' while ignoring the human rights abuses in its rival India, particularly Kashmir, only strengthens the militant right in both countries.

Short-sighted policies implemented for political expediency in Pakistan or abroad, will lead to the strengthening of a taliban-like order which will have long-term negative impacts, not just for Pakistan but for the entire region and beyond. For Pakistan, it will spell economic disaster and the end of democracy and human rights, isolating it as a pariah in the world community. A nuclear pariah, which the world cannot afford to ignore.

This is why the world must link demands for guarantees of human rights in Pakistan with economic cooperation with that country, and this is why the people of Pakistan must organise and resist attempts to sweep them back into the dark ages. For this, there must be economic development, and education, and the people provided basic necessities like the 'roti, kapra aur makan' promised to them in the 1970s.

Meanwhile, the burning question remains, will the forces of retrogression that currently appear to dominate, allow the other, quieter revolution of human rights awareness and education to bear fruit -- and can they stop it in today's global village?



 

Speakers

Biju Mathew
"Role of the South Asian Diaspora in Defense of Secularism, Human Rights and Peace" Read the text

Christophe Jaffrelot
"Hindus and Muslims in the Communal Era"Read the text

Beena Sarwar
"Human Rights in Pakistan: Challenge of orthodoxy and Autocraty"Read the text

V.Krishna Ananth
"The Political Economy of Fascism: Some observations on contemporary political discourse in India"Read the text

 

 

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